Peer-reviewed article
A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
Nina Buchmann, Erica Field, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen, Xiaoyu Wang ·
Summary
Written by AI, not yet AICS's view · claude-haiku-4-5-20251001This study tested whether financial incentives and a girls' empowerment program could reduce child marriage in Bangladesh. A two-year financial incentive reduced early marriage by 19 percent among eligible girls, but the empowerment program alone did not work. The researchers found that the incentive may work partly as a signal about girls' type, with effects spilling over to other girls in the community.
Key points
- Financial incentives for delaying marriage reduced underage marriage by 19 percent over two years
- A girls' empowerment program alone failed to decrease adolescent marriage
- Results fit a signaling model where bride type is imperfectly observed by potential husbands
- Substantial spillover effects of the incentive were observed on untreated girls
- Socially conservative girls, the preferred type, have lower returns to delaying marriage
Limitations
The document does not specify the size or composition of the study population, the duration of follow-up beyond two years, or whether effects persisted after incentives ended. It is unclear whether results generalise beyond this specific context in Bangladesh.
Abstract
Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incentive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types (socially conservative girls) have lower returns to delaying marriage. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we observe substantial spillovers of the incentive on untreated nonpreferred types.
Findings the Hub has extracted
Each claim below is labelled by its type of design and links back to this report.
- Intervention
- Financial incentive to delay marriage for two years, combined with or separate from a girls' empowerment program
- Population
- Girls in Bangladesh eligible for the incentive program
Key finding
Girls eligible for two years of financial incentive were 19 percent less likely to marry underage