Evaluation report
A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
Nina Buchmann, Erica Field, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen, Xiao Yu Wang ·
Summary
Written by AI, not yet AICS's view · claude-haiku-4-5-20251001This study tests two approaches to reduce child marriage in Bangladesh: a financial incentive to delay marriage and a girls' empowerment program designed to change gender norms. A financial incentive reduced underage marriage by 19% among eligible girls and unexpectedly also reduced it among ineligible girls. However, the empowerment program successfully changed norms toward gender equality but did not reduce child marriage and actually increased dowry payments, suggesting that shifting attitudes alone is insufficient without economic incentives.
Key points
- Financial incentive to delay marriage reduced underage marriage by 19% among eligible girls
- The financial incentive also reduced early marriage among ineligible non-preferred type women
- Girls' empowerment program successfully promoted more progressive gender norms
- The empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage rates
- The empowerment program increased dowry payments
Limitations
The document does not clarify the specific design details of the randomization, the duration of follow-up, or how 'underage marriage' and 'preferred types' were defined and measured. It is unclear whether the effects persisted over longer time periods or in different contexts.
Abstract
Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown.We introduce a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types have lower returns to delaying marriage.We show that in this environment the market might pool on early marriage even when everyone would benefit from delay.In this setting, offering a small incentive can delay marriage of all treated types and untreated nonpreferred types, while programs that act directly on norms can unintentionally encourage early marriage.We test these theoretical predictions by experimentally evaluating a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program designed to shift norms.As predicted, girls eligible for the incentive are 19% less likely to marry underage, as are nonpreferred type women ineligible for the incentive.Meanwhile, the empowerment program was successful in promoting more progressive gender norms but failed to decrease adolescent marriage and increased dowry payments.