When Children Lose Bargaining Power: An Economic Model of Domestic Violence against Children

This paper uses economic game theory to model domestic violence against children, examining how children's bargaining power influences violent outcomes with their parents. The analysis compares two scenarios: one where children have external support services that provide negotiating leverage, and another where they have no such support. The model shows that parents adjust their violent behavior based on children's threat points, either matching them to support levels or maximizing violence below intervention thresholds. The research extends economic violence models by focusing specifically on children, who typically lack the resources available to adult victims.

Key points

• Children's bargaining power, supported by external services, influences the level of violence parents use
• When children retain negotiating leverage through support services, parents use violence only up to the point matching the child's threat point
• When children lose bargaining power entirely, parents maximize violent behavior while remaining below external intervention thresholds
• Children differ from adult domestic violence victims in lacking economic resources or negotiating leverage
• The model extends existing economic domestic violence theory to specifically address violence against children

Limitations

This is a theoretical model without empirical data or testing, so it cannot demonstrate whether the predicted bargaining dynamics actually occur in real families or determine the magnitude of effects. The paper does not evaluate an actual intervention or provide evidence about what happens when support services are implemented in practice.